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The paper focuses on the reception of Derrida’s Archive Fever among (new) media theorists and 
its relevance for the ongoing discussions in that academic field. Although this Derrida’s text is 
often described as the one in which he provides a statement on the pervasive revolutionary impact 
of new media, its reception among media theorists remains scarce. Several media scholars that 
tackle the text, however, have an ambivalent stance on it: they appreciate some of Derrida’s theses, 
but regard them largely obsolete.
The first part of the paper analyzes these critiques and argues that many of the objections on 
Derrida’s behalf are caused by the misinterpretation of important features of the deconstructive 
thought. In its second part, the paper firstly deals with certain weaker points of Derrida’s reflection 
and then proceeds to examine his insights pertinent to the problems of contemporary media theory 
that were neglected in earlier reception. Finally, paper reaffirms the claim about the need for 
a more profound exchange between the deconstruction and media studies, albeit one that would 
avoid the examined shortcomings.
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1. Introduction
Although already the jacket cover of Derrida’s Archive Fever (1996) 
promises a work in which he “offers for the first time a major statement 
on the pervasive impact of electronic media, particularly e-mail,” issues 
* This paper has been supported by Croatian Science Foundation under the project 
IP-2018-01-7020 “Literary Revolutions.”
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typically attracting the attention of media studies are not exactly the sole 
and central topic of that Derrida’s complex text. Nevertheless, among Der-
rida scholars, Archive Fever has remained known as his rare excursion in 
the new media field, and that characterization is far from being entirely 
unjustified.
On the other hand, it is true – as Gane and Beer (2008, 75) and 
Strathausen (2009, 142) notice – that Derrida never attempted to develop 
a systematical media theory, at least in a narrower sense.1 As a matter of 
fact, he seldom wrote about electronic media,2 despite recognizing him-
self as a passionate TV consumer (cf. Derrida, Stiegler, 2002). It is thus 
no wonder that, unlike certain other comparable scholars (most notably 
Deleuze),3 Derrida’s name rarely appears as a major reference in classics 
of the (new) media theory. This fact indubitably contributes to the rather 
scarce reception of Archive Fever among media theorists: the reputation 
it enjoys in its original scholarly domains is not perfectly matched in the 
neighboring field of media studies, where the text is only sporadically 
cited.
Certain media theorists, nonetheless, engaged in a more thorough anal-
ysis of Derrida’s Archive Fever. By dedicating it more space and attention 
than it was the case earlier, they tried to disclose the potential usefulness of 
Derrida’s work for the broadening of the perspective of media studies, but 
also to underscore what they considered various shortcomings of Archive 
Fever and other Derrida’s media-related reflections, caused by his inade-
quate understanding of media theory. The curious common denominator of 
those readings, however, is that, on the one hand, they unanimously utterly 
1 Most of Derrida’s work, of course, pertains to the question of media in the most general 
sense; that fact is – unfortunately – often overlooked in the field of media studies. However, 
Derrida never systematically dealt with a particular (type of) media and produced discourse 
typical for what is today recognized as media studies/theory. 
2 Besides in Archive Fever (1996), Derrida most notably dealt with media in a minor seg-
ment of Specters of Marx (1994) and in his interviews published in Ecographies of Television 
(Derrida, Stiegler, 2002).
3 Among the theorists usually referred to as poststructuralist, Deleuze is certainly most 
influential in media studies. Above all, his notion of rhizome (cf. Deleuze, Guattari, 1987) 
was often used by media theorist to conceptualize decentered nature of new media, and his 
Postscript on the Societies of Control (Deleuze, 1992) is an unavoidable reference in many of 
the contemporary studies on new media. 
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agree with Derrida on the revolutionary impact that new media have made 
on the structure of the modern-day archives, while on the other hand they 
argue that the same impact caused Derrida’s theoretical perspective to be-
come obsolete in relation to new media. 
This paper will argue that the root of the aforementioned paradox lies 
in what we may characterize as a reciprocal deficit of understanding, albeit 
situated on different ontological levels. Moreover, it will try to underscore 
that the divergence of the two perspectives directly affects the different 
conceptualizations of and approaches to the archive which is undergoing 
presumed revolutionary change.
In its first part, the paper thus aims to show that the dismissal of 
Derrida’s theoretical viewpoint as obsolete results from a lack of un-
derstanding of the fundamental features of deconstructivist thought, i.e. 
from the misunderstanding of ontological nature of Derrida’s concepts 
such as writing and text/textuality, as well as his other related “(quasi-)
concepts” (Choat, 2010, 70). It is important to note, and that matter will 
be addressed throughout the paper, that this misunderstanding is not an 
isolated problem, but the basis of further differences regarding the con-
ceptualization of the archive.
The second part of the paper tackles two different yet interrelated is-
sues. Firstly, it focuses on the elements of Derrida’s discourse on (new) 
media that largely justify the objections of media scholars on his behalf, 
since they indicate a lack of understanding of certain specificity of new 
media, albeit on a different, more concrete level (ontic, so to say). Finally, 
the paper proceeds to examine the potential which deconstruction – espe-
cially Derrida’s treatment of archive – possesses to benefit media studies; 
the possibility that remained out of the focus due to these reciprocal mis-
understandings.
All the outlined research question will be approached from the theo-
retical standpoint that is overtly Derridian, although it maintains dialogue 
with some of the seminal studies of media theory. The close (deconstruc-
tive?) reading applied on the texts of Derrida’s critics, however, will not 
spare certain aspects of Derrida’s Archive Fever as well.
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2. Has the archival revolution in the new media context  
made deconstruction obsolete? 
The rift separating media studies from dominant currents of contem-
porary literary theory and continental philosophy, causing discrepancies 
of reception of Derrida between the two of its sides, did not remain unno-
ticed in earlier discussions. Strathausen (2009) addresses it in his critique 
on Derrida’s reflections on media, albeit not without contradictions. He 
argues that the productive interaction between deconstruction and media 
theory is impeded by the “significant methodological differences between 
the hermeneutic approach of literary studies […] and the post-hermeneutic 
approach favored by contemporary media studies” (Strathausen, 2009, 
141). In other words,
the former study the production of meaning on the textual level via a semiotic critique 
of linguistic signification and rhetorical structures, whereas the latter dismiss these 
very processes as secondary effects of the technological media and the materialities 
of communication that enable meaning production in the first place (Strathausen, 
2009, 141). 
However, on the very beginning of his text, Strathausen (2009, 140) 
points to Derrida’s claim that one of the central tasks of deconstruction is 
“to resist the naturalizing effects of technology and the televised image;” 
namely the very opposite of what was previously described as the “herme-
neutic approach.” Indeed, if the “hermeneutic approach” implies a form of 
preference of signified over the signifier, then deconstruction is as far re-
moved from it as possible. Already in his earliest writings, Derrida (2001, 
353, 355) argued against the “reduction of the structurality of structure,” 
i.e. “reducing or deriving the signifier” in favor of the signified/referent, 
and that standpoint is shared by a significant part of the contemporary lit-
erary theory. On the contrary, the strong emphasis that certain currents of 
media studies put exclusively on the technical dimension of a medium is 
a form of transcendentality itself.
A somewhat simplified vision of deconstruction, closely related to 
analogous perspective on literary studies, is a common denominator of 
other objections to Derrida’s understanding of media laid out in Archive 
Fever as well. Both Strathausen (2009, 140) and Gane and Beer (2008, 
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71, 76)4 argue that a significant problem for the application of Derrida’s 
concept of the archive (and deconstruction in general) on new media field 
is its emphasized textual nature which falls short when confronted with the 
multimedial character of the new media. However, they either fail to notice 
or simply disagree with the fact that Derrida’s notions of (arche-)writing 
and text imply an interweaving of differential engravings and traces that 
cannot be reduced to the linear phonetic writing.5 As a matter of fact, in 
his early work Freud and the Scene of Writing, the text on which Archive 
Fever largely relies, Derrida explicitly notes that “at decisive moments of 
his itinerary” Freud recursed to metaphorical models borrowed “not from 
spoken language or from verbal forms, nor even from phonetic writing, but 
from the script which is never subject to, never exterior and posterior to, 
the spoken word”6 (Derrida, 2001, 249; regarding Freudian metaphors for 
“primary” writing; metaphors including hieroglyphics, pictographic and 
ideogrammatic elements, comic-like graphic usage of words etc. cf. Der-
rida, 2002, 262, 274).
This narrow understanding of Derrida’s notions is an interesting inver-
sion of decade-earlier connections drawn between Derrida’s conceptual 
4 Gane and Beer (1988, 148) state that a “privileging of the written form” is “prevalent in 
Derridean” (Gane and Beer, 2008, 71) approach to archive, as well as that Derrida’s perspec-
tive on new media is determined by his “textual bias” that “privileges writing […] over all 
other forms of archival data” (Gane and Beer, 2008, 76). Strathausen claims that “Derrida’s 
own philosophical project has been primarily concerned with intralinguistic relationship be-
tween speech and writing rather than with the intermedial relationship of words and images” 
(Strathausen, 2009, 140). However, the opposition between word and image, or writing and 
other forms of data, is unsustainable in light of Derrida’s (arche-)writing and related concepts, 
since they do not discern between various forms of differential traces/engravings.
5 These misunderstandings are probably the ground for a rather confusing Strathausen’s 
statement regarding Derrida’s (in)famous and often misinterpreted thesis that “[t]here is no-
thing outside of the text” (Derrida, 1997, 158), i. e. that “every referent, all reality has the 
structure of a differential trace, and that one cannot refer to this ‘real’ except in an interpreta-
tive experience.” Strathausen (2009, 143) argues that “[m]edia theory […] will readily agree 
with the latter part of Derrida’s statement. Yet it will remain suspicious of the first – parti-
cularly if ‘trace’ is understood solely in semiotic-linguistic terms, which limits rather than 
enhances our understanding of the nexus among media, the body, and the real.” It is however 
impossible to truly separate the two parts of Derrida’s statement, and if the latter part is ac-
cept ed, it automatically implies acceptance of the broader concept of the term trace.
6 In other words – a lot of concepts that could be used to describe new media content as 
well.
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apparatus and new media which were more affirmative, albeit equally 
simplifying. As Aarseth (1997, 82) notes, many early studies on hypertext 
(e.g. Bolter’s) “often concerned with showing how hypertext embodies 
the iconoclastic musing of the so-called poststructuralist movement.” For 
some of media theorists in those years, new media finally realized Derri-
dian blueprint of general textuality. In contrast, for several previously men-
tioned readers of Archive Fever, new media made it completely obsolete.
Both stances are overly reductive since Derrida’s concepts in ques-
tion pertain to the ontological features that are common to both new and 
old media. However, while the earlier stance is clearly a mistake in dis-
cerning levels of the ontic-ontological difference, the latter seems to be 
even more confusing. When referring to Derridian différance, Strathausen 
(2009, 155) states that he has “no difficulty accepting Derrida’s ontologi-
cal claim,” however a moment later he contradicts it and argues that 
différance is not a neutral term to refer to such otherness. It is a media-specific term 
culled from and referring back to the world as “seen” through language. Unless we keep 
this in mind, Derrida’s claim becomes tautological: he registers the living presence 
through language, and since language is structured by différance, the living presence 
itself appears to be structured by différance (Strathausen, 2009, 155).
Moreover, he even claims that “Derrida underestimate[s] the ontologi-
cal and epistemological challenges technological change poses to Derri-
da’s concept of différance” (Strathausen, 2009, 156), since modern physics 
established the speed of light as the absolute border no discourse can trans-
cend, which should lead to a conclusion that “telemediated real time (and 
a fortiori digital data storage) cannot simply be reduced to merely another 
‘effect of différance’” (Strathausen, 2009, 156).
Such reduction of différance first to media-specifics of (conventional) 
text mediation, and then to a mere issue of delay in the information transfer, 
clearly testifies about a lack of understanding of the concept. And the issue 
in question is far from being of secondary importance or petty sophistic, 
since one of the fundaments for the reflections of Archive Fever is the decon-
struction of the opposition between the lived experience/living memory and 
the prosthetic mechanical inscription; the apprehension of the ineradicable 
contamination of the lived presence by the prosthetic, mechanic, inscribed, 
i.e. the understanding of the work of the trace and différance.
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Not only that new media are not exempted from the differential logic 
of the trace (or have overcome it), but they are – as Wolfe (2008, 87) sug-
gests – even a more convenient example of it, due to their more discreet 
structure.7 However, Wolfe is not simply forming another binarism. On the 
contrary, she underscores that she is not trying to say “that analog is the 
‘real’ other of the digital that it haunts. Rather, the structure of any ‘discre-
tization’, any diacritical system, is that of a ‘trace’ in Derrida’s sense – the 
iterability in and through which it can function, and only can function, as 
a medium and archive” (Wolfe, 2008, 89).8
Moreover, the phenomenon of différance is the very reason behind the 
divergence between Derrida’s concept of archive and the one embraced 
by his new media critics. Unlike the approaches that conceive the archive 
as a static sum of existing documents/data, what Derrida dubs ‘archive’ in 
Archive Fever (1996) implies a result of every temporary stabilization of 
a differential system of traces of writing/engraving. Still, it is not limited 
to what is present, but rather includes the determination by the absent and 
the irreducible, spectral excess.
That brings us to another element, besides the spectral work of the 
trace, that equally characterizes archive even after its new media transfor-
mation; an element that is articulated in an etymologic-genealogical re-
flection at the beginning of Archive Fever. There Derrida (1996, 1) points 
to the ancient Greek term ἀρχή, meaning both commencement and com-
mandment. From it, he derives two principles inseparably at work in the 
archive: sequential and jussive, principles of sheer natural ordering and 
of an organization according to laws and rules; an opposition that reem-
bodies the binarism between φύσις and τέχνη/νόμος. Moreover, in ancient 
7 Wolfe (2008, 87) refers to Ecographies of Television, in which Derrida introduces the 
issue of discretization already in regard with analog images (Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 59), 
while Stiegler, same as Wolfe, recognizes it as property even more characteristic for digital 
media (Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 148). However, they are not the only ones who notice it. In 
his seminal study The Language of New Media, Manovich (2002, 49 et passim) identifies five 
fundamental principles of new media that logically derive from one another, with numerical 
representation being the first, and modularity deriving immediately from it. 
8 In other words, „the ‘deadening’ or ‘derealization’ typically associated with digital 
technologies vs. the ontological ‘umbilical cord’ of analog is always already in play with any 
form of representation, any archive, any semiosis whether of the word or the image” (Wolfe, 
2008, 90).
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ἀρχεῖον, the magistrate’s private house and seat which also housed public 
documents, Derrida (1996, 2 et passim) recognizes “a privileged topology” 
that institutes a hermeneutic authority, (re)establishes the law, interweaves 
private (secret) and public, singular and universal etc.
Derrida’s genealogical excursion to antiquity has apparently confused 
some of his critics, prompting them to diminish relevance of his insights for 
archive in the age of new media. Gane and Beer (2008, 72–73), for instance, 
understand the privileged topology of archive in overly literal manner, sug-
gesting that Derrida’s perspective could be adjoined to those “traditional 
conceptions of the archive as a body of ‘officially’ classified texts” in a dedi-
cated centralized place, an official building, rather than to conceptions which 
recognize archives as “increasingly decentralized in form and are more open 
than ever to ‘lay’ access and production” (Gane and Beer, 2008, 72).
However, although Derrida used a very archaic form of the archive as 
his prime example, “the archontic power” with “functions of unification, 
identification, of classification,” paired up with “consignation” – a coordi-
nation “of a single corpus in a system or a synchrony in which all the ele-
ments articulate the unity of an ideal configuration” (Derrida, 1996, 3) – is 
structurally equally at work in any contemporary archive as well. No matter 
how decentralized/distributed and interactive an archive today is, there are 
always certain power nodes – materially existing protocols and institutions – 
as privileged points of recognition, selection, inscription and organization of 
archivable content (cf. Derrida, 1994, 78, as well as Galloway’s, 2004 influ-
ential study Protocol. How Control Exists after Decentralization), and that 
structural necessity is metonymically associated with the historical ἀρχεῖον. 
This structural necessity brings into question Gane’s and Beer’s (2008, 
82) claims that the contemporary development of new media “gives rise 
to a culture that creates and stores innumerable traces of itself, and from 
which nothing is easily excluded (reversing the logic of previous archival 
forms).” There is no doubt that new media in its actual historical context 
greatly exercise its democratizing potential, and that its structure is more 
suitable to democratic usage than the centralized structure of traditional 
mass-media; Derrida agrees with it as well.9 However, new media are not 
9 Derrida stated: „I believe that this technical transformation – of the telephone, of the 
fax machine, of television, e-mail and Internet – will have done more for what is called 
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necessarily emancipatory per se. Even more important than that, no matter 
if certain archival media are (deemed as) emancipatory/democratic or not, 
the mere concept of the archive, at least in Derridian sense, implies the 
necessity of certain selections and exclusions to be made.10
These problematical aspects of the reception of Archive Fever are all 
logically connected and proceed one from another, altogether deriving 
from a misunderstanding not of the properties of new media, but rather of 
the significant elements of Derrida’s thought. However, it would be unfair 
both to Derrida and his critics to reduce everything to a single aspect, no 
matter how important it seems. And by moving forward, toward issues 
more often problematized by media theory, we could notice examples of 
a diametrically opposite situation: both valid critical objections on Der-
rida’s lack of technological savvy, as well as some of his potential contri-
butions to ongoing discussions in media theory that have so far remained 
unnoticed. 
3. Reciprocal blind spots and potential  
for a mutual improvement of understanding
Not every objection to the treatment of new media in Derrida’s Ar-
chive Fever is based on misunderstanding or lack of insight in deconstruc-
tion. On the contrary, some of them are on target and prove that elements 
of superficiality can be criticized on both ends of the dialogue. Unlike 
the shortcomings analyzed in previous segment, Derrida’s lapses gener-
ally pertain to the higher level of specificity and result partially from the 
‘democratization’, even in countries in the East, than all the discourses on behalf on human 
rights, more than all the presentations of models in whose name this democratization was able 
to get started” (Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 71). He later added that he believes no totalitarian re-
gime, no matter its strength, “can survive above a certain threshold in the density of telephone 
network” (Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 72). However, elsewhere he also warned on the increasing 
role of new media in distortion and manipulation of the public space in parliamentary demo-
cracy (cf. Derrida, 1994, 98).
10 It is important to notice that the unavoidable selectivity of the archive appears on more 
than the one end – not only in selection and inscription of what is recognized as an event but 
also in its reception. Derrida refers to it by the term reappropriation, which cannot be neither 
non-existing nor total (Derrida, Stigler, 2002, 111).
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deficit of familiarity with the technology of new media, but also from an 
unusual lack of thoroughness in their examination. He comments on new 
media with quite a lightness and assurance, but in the same time seldom 
elaborates systematically the theses he sketches, nor he engages in a closer 
reading of media theory, which is altogether hardly comparable with the 
characteristic of his approach to literature or philosophy, and in direct con-
tradiction with the importance deconstruction places on the materiality of 
signifier.
Moreover, Strathausen (2009, 147) rightfully disapproves Derrida’s 
term teletechnology, used to designate new, but also some of the tradi-
tional media. Although the opinions of (new) media theorists about the 
most proper term for the object in question are not unison, and the most 
widespread notion of “new media” is far from being flawless (cf. Peović 
Vuković, 2012, 79 et passim for a concise overview of that matter), Der-
rida’s choice is quite problematic. Not only that his usage of the term, as 
Strathausen points out, is rather unsystematic, occasionally encapsulating 
structurally different media, but also the term itself underscores only a sin-
gle dimension of the designated object, namely not even a particularly dis-
tinctive one. By focusing on the distance which teletechnology surmounts, 
Derrida periodically disregards the differences between various media re-
garding the technological substratum, overlooks the question of their struc-
ture (centralized, decentralized or distributed – cf. Galloway, 2004, 11) and 
thus endangers the distinctiveness of the employed term to the extent that, 
at an occasion, under that umbrella term he even includes written letter (cf. 
Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 37).11
Derrida’s lack of familiarity with new media is also the most probable 
reason behind the privileging of e-mail as an example of the transformation 
of the archive they caused. Although Gane and Beer (2008, 76) ascribed 
it to a more general textual bias of Derrida’s theory, which we discarded 
as problematic, the basic objection they raise is valid. In Poster’s (1997, 
201) distinction between the usage of new media which improved existing 
social functions and the one that shaped new social functions, which Poster 
11 The disregards are unintentional error; Derrida in the same time argues that one should 
pay attention to all the specificities of a communication situation within a given media (cf. 
Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 38). 
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considers the most important criteria for answering the question of what is 
new about new media, the e-mail surely belongs closer to the first group.
It is easy to agree with Derrida that 
electronic mail today […] is on the way to transforming the entire public and private 
space of humanity […]. It is not only a technique, in the ordinary and limited sense of 
the term: at an unprecedented rhythm, in quasiinstantaneous fashion, this instrumental 
possibility of production, of printing, of conservation, and of destruction of the archive 
must inevitably be accompanied by juridical and thus political transformations (Derri-
da, 1996, 17).
Be that as it may, it is equally true that other new media phenomena 
have introduced far more radical changes to the archive, and consequently 
incited equally more drastic social transformations.
What is, however, very surprising in the reception of Archive Fever is the 
fact that these social and political dimensions of the transformations caused 
by new media are only marginally discussed. Yet Derrida (1996) dedicates 
far more attention to that topic than to the reflections on particular media and 
their technological substrata. As a matter of fact, he argues that
the question of a politics of the archive is our permanent orientation here […]. This 
ques tion will never be determined as one political question among others. It runs 
through the whole of the field and in truth determines politics from top to bottom as res 
publica (Derrida, 1996, 4).
The immense importance which Derrida places on the politics of ar-
chive is even better understood having in mind his claim that “the archive, 
as printing, writing, prosthesis, or hypomnesic technique in general is 
not only the place for stocking and for conserving” (Derrida, 1996, 16) 
of other wise independently existing events; it is the “technical structure 
of the archiving archive” that “determines the structure of the archivable 
content even in its very coming into existence and in its relationship to the 
future” (Derrida, 1996, 17). However, the same blind spot in the reception 
of Archive Fever which caused the neglection of his immense emphasis on 
the politics of archive, has also contributed to the reductive understanding 
of that Derrida’s thesis.
Scholars as Gane and Beer (2008, 75) and Wells (2008, 1) liken the 
above-mentioned Derrida’s claim to the McLuhan’s (1994) privileging 
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the technical properties of media, most famously sublimed in his catch-
phrase that media is the message. Yet, while this comparison certainly is 
on point for many reasons, it is also necessary to supplement it with an im-
portant difference. In more than a few studies about new media (cf. Peović 
Vuković, 2012, 18, 20; Hjorth, 2011, 12–13; Gane, Beer, 2008, 39 etc.). 
McLuhan is considered an epitome of the reductive techno-determinism. 
Although Derrida’s theses might seem equally techno-deterministic, the 
important difference lies in the absence of the firm border between the 
sides of the allegedly deterministic relationship.
It is true Derrida (1996, 15) claims that “upheavals in progress” of the 
archival technic affect “the very structures of the psychic apparatus,” i.e. 
that the technical innovations introduced by new media go hand in hand 
not only with revolutionized segments of the public sphere but also with 
transformation of individual psyches. However, the question of causal-
ity between these factors is less clear than in typical techno-deterministic 
para digm, since they are not discretely separable. 
According to Derrida (1996, 12), the archive is “entrusted to the out-
side,” as a parergonal element of the body proper (communal or indivi-
dual); “but where does the outside commence? This question is the ques-
tion of the archive. There are undoubtedly no others” (Derrida, 1996, 12). 
And it is an unanswerable question, because the reaching of what he calls 
the subjectile, the moment in which “the singular imprint […] barely dis-
tinguishes from the impression” (Derrida, 1996, 99), in which archive is 
confused with ἀρχή (Derrida, 1996, 98), and the lived unity of the imprint 
and impression opposes to the prosthetic, mechanic, iterative inscription of 
the archive, is but a dream.12
This issue is already articulated by Derrida (2001, 287) in Freud and 
the Scene of Writing, where he underscores the double metaphor built on 
the analogy between the psyche and the archival machine; the latter at the 
same time being an external, inferior supplement to the finitude of the 
psychical organization, and the very best metaphor of its inner structure 
(or more than a metaphor, since the text reveals the inseparability of the 
12 Interestingly enough, questioning himself about the “moment proper to the archive” 
Derrida (1994, 26) reaches for a new media example – a floating text on a computer screen in 
the moment when the ‘save’ button is pressed.
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living experience, memory and prosthetic inscription). When those earlier 
insights are combined with what is further elaborated in Archive Fever, it 
becomes clear that one can also add the structure of public sphere to this 
indissoluble entanglement of structures of the individual psyche and archi-
val machines.
In other words, the ballistic metaphor Lévy (2001, 3) mentions, of 
technology conceptualized as a projectile which strikes individuals and 
culture/society conceptualized as targets, is invalid for the description of 
Derrida’s perspective. Although Derrida stresses the determinative effect 
of the archival technologies, unlike techno-determinists he does not con-
ceptualize technology as an autonomous agent. The deconstructive per-
spective on this issue offers a way out of the binary opposition between the 
techno-deterministic and culture-centered approaches that have troubled 
media studies for a long time; an alternative that is not a sublation of the 
two sides but rather another manifestation of différance.13 However, since 
the critiques of Archive Fever have misunderstood the logic of différance 
in the first place, they have consequently omitted to notice the alternative 
it provides to one of the dilemmas most persistent in discussions about 
technology. 
Moreover, Derrida’s perspective on new media – in contrast to techno-
deterministic ones – is neither pessimist nor optimist. He notices the revo-
lutionary change incited by new media, but he ascribes to it neither grim 
nor bright outcome per se. Instead, he is interested in the political potential 
of new archival technologies. The mentioned unattainability of the abso-
lute ground, of ἀρχή, is the fundamental prerequisite for the existence of 
politics whatsoever. And although this lack of transcendental anchoring 
point is not an innovation introduced by new media, Derrida emphasizes 
that they have improved its visibility and consequently have opened a new 
space for the subversion of various forms of grounding. 
13 The above-described position, that subverts the binary opposition in relation to which 
it is defined, matches the one that deconstruction assumes towards the binary opposition 
between idealism and materialism (cf. Derrida, 1981, 50), or between the approaches focused 
on historical and institutional context and the ones focused on discourses and concepts (cf. 
Derrida, 1995, 72). Those oppositions are, on the other side, both relevant to framing the dis-
cussions between techno-determinism and various semiotic or materialist cultural-oriented 
approaches in media theory. 
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Thus he underscores that new media have enabled the going beyond 
the traditional conceptualization of the virtual (Derrida, 1996, 67), as well 
as the undermining of conventional concepts of citizenship and hospitality 
(Derrida, Stiegler, 2002, 36) by the significant expansion of their referents – 
altogether a matter of crucial importance for Derrida’s idea of politics. Tech-
nological transformation of the archive in the new media era has additionally 
emphasized those spectral characteristics of the archive that surpass the firm 
grounding and metaphysic of presence. Moreover, the uncertainty about the 
results of this transformation, paired with a hunch that they will be vast, only 
additionally accentuate the fact that any question about the archive, same 
as any question on true politics – and the question of archive is the political 
question par excellence – deals not so much with a past given at our disposal, 
as with a future to come (Derrida, 1996, 36). According to Derrida, the ques-
tion of such future is never situated in the domain of calculable; it cannot 
be answered with an answer derived from a technological substratum or the 
social domain that surrounds it, although it simultaneously precedes them 
and follows from them. It is the question of radical undecidability, radical 
hope and radical investment; a matter of messianic “heterogenous to […] 
any horizon of waiting as such” (Derrida, 1996, 72).
The complex and often forking argumentation of Archive Fever thus 
proves the relevance even of Derrida’s discourse on the messianic – a dis-
course that initially seems like an odd addition to the constellation of me-
dia studies – to a number of issues in that field. But even more importantly, 
on the broader level, it (once again) confirms that the relevance of Der-
rida’s work to media theory is far from being limited only to the explicitly 
media-related studies, spanning to deconstruction in general.  
Revolutionary changes introduced by new media, therefore, did not – 
as some studies suggested – make deconstructive thought obsolete, nor 
they enabled the “embodiment” of its theoretical models. However, for 
the numerous potential merits of deconstruction for media theory to fur-
ther emerge to the foreground, the bilateral improvement in the reception 
is needed. As it was demonstrated, Derrida’s reflections on archive im-
portant to new media studies derive directly from fundamental features 
of his thought which were often overlooked or oversimplified in earlier 
reception, so their further reception and application in that field remained 
scarce. On the other hand, for those rather general insights to become more 
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operative and precise, more familiarity with media studies would be desir-
able than it is usually exerted by scholars dealing with deconstruction.
Steps taken forward on both ends would allow us to better understand 
both the scope of revolutionariness of archive transformations caused by 
new media, as well as structural features of the archive in general, which 
new media only make more (or less) noticeable. It is thus necessary to 
agree with Strathausen (2009, 142) that “a more profound exchange be-
tween deconstruction and contemporary media theory” should be a priority 
for both. However, since the earlier attempts of communication – despite 
their achievements – were marked by certain lags and bugs, it might be 
a good thing to go for a reboot.
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